A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the Venture Capital Cycle by Gebhardt, Georg
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2006 
 
 
*Georg Gebhardt, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28 (Rgb.), D-80539 Munich. 
Tel.: +49 89 2180 2876, Georg.Gebhardt@LRZ.uni-muenchen.de 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
 
Discussion Paper No. 173 
A Soft Budget Constraint 
Explanation for the 
Venture Capital Cycle 
Georg Gebhardt* 
A Soft Budget Constraint Explanation for the
Venture Capital Cycle
Georg Gebhardt
University of Munich∗
October 2006
Abstract
We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they
raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because
it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture which
multiplies the well known agency problems. We argue that an inside in-
vestor cannot provide a hard budget constraint while a less well informed
outsider can. Therefore, the venture capitalist delegates the continuation
decision to the outsider by ex ante restricting the amount of capital he has
under management. The soft budget constraint problem becomes the more
important the higher the entrepreneur’s private benefits are and the higher
the probability of failure of a project is.
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"We had to push our device over one major technical hurdle (. . . ). I
estimated it would take $8 million. When I was told we had $2 million
and no more, I thought we were finished. (. . . ) In the end, we did it
for $2 million (. . . ). Looking back, if we had the $8 million I might
never have gotten our engineers to drop their pet projects to ensure
the success of our principal product." 1
The above quote highlights that practitioners are well aware of the positive
incentive effects a hard budget constraint has on start-up entrepreneurs. This
paper develops a model that formalizes this intuition. We show that a well
informed investor may ex post have an incentive not to liquidate an unsuccessful
venture although ex ante he would like to commit to doing so. By raising only a
limited amount of capital in the form of a venture capital fund the investor can
effectively delegate the continuation decision to new investors, who - due to their
lack of inside information - will terminate all unsuccessful projects.
A large literature has analyzed different aspects of the organization of ven-
ture capital funds: compensation schemes (Gompers and Lerner 1999a), the
use of covenants (Gompers and Lerner 1996, Hellmann 1998), staged financing
(Gompers 1995, Neher 1999) and convertible securities (Berglöf 1994, Schmidt
2003, Cornelli and Yosha 2003). However, the way venture capital funds restrict
their access to capital after an initial amount has been raised has attracted scant
1Clayton, Gambill, and Harned (1999) p.51.
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attention in the literature. The amount of equity that is raised is limited and
cannot be increased later. Moreover, venture capital contracts do not allow the
fund to reinvest profits or issue debt.2 These restrictions enforce the so called
"venture capital cycle"3 during which capital is first raised, then invested and,
finally after some time, returned to the investors together with some interest.
This process distinguishes venture capitalists from other intermediaries such as
banks who raise, invest and return capital simultaneously.
After capital has been raised most of it is invested immediately in several firms
so that the venture capital fund is unlikely to have enough capital to finance all
its portfolio firms until an IPO or tradesale. This gives rise to syndication, i.e.
co-financing of later rounds by new venture capitalists.4
This practice is puzzling given that the relationship between the different
venture capitalists should suffer from similar asymmetric information problems
as the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs. These problems are
known to be severe. What is the advantage of limiting the capital available
to venture capitalists if this limitation leads to a multiplication of contracting
problems that could be avoided by giving more capital to the intermediary in the
first place?
2See Gompers and Lerner (1999b), p.38-39.
3This term was coined by Gompers and Lerner (1999b).
4Lerner (1994) reports that on average 2.2 new investors enter in the second round of fi-
nancing and 2 in later ones. 0.7 first round investors do not reinvest in the second round, and
0.9 investors of earlier rounds do not reinvest in each subsequent round (see p. 20).
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The answer we give in this paper is that the lack of capital of the original in-
vestor forces the entrepreneur to find new investors. The fact that these investors
are less well informed than the original investor is shown to be advantageous be-
cause it provides a hard budget constraint for the entrepreneur which increases
her ex ante incentives to exert effort. In the following, we will briefly outline the
intuition for our main result.
Consider a wealth constrained entrepreneur who obtains capital from an in-
vestor. The investor is only interested in monetary returns while the entrepreneur
derives a private benefit from running the firm. The entrepreneur’s effort is nec-
essary for the success of the project but cannot be contracted upon.
The quality of the project is unknown to both parties ex ante. If capital and
effort are supplied the quality can ex post be inferred from the realization of
profits. Without effort all types of projects deliver low profits and nothing can
be learned.
The original investor can observe the effort choice. If the profit realization is
low although effort has been exerted he understands that the project is likely to
be of bad quality and will not refinance the venture. If he observes that no effort
has been exerted the investor still holds his a priori belief and it is optimal for
him to refinance the project.
This creates a trade off for the entrepreneur when deciding whether to supply
effort or not: On the one hand, by exerting effort she looses her private benefits
in the next period if the project turns out to be a failure. On the other hand she
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gains because she avoids delaying the monetary payoff for a period if the project
turns out to be a success. For a small net present value project the potential
surplus accruing to the entrepreneur is small and the former effect dominates. In
this case she will not exert effort. This is anticipated by the investor who will
not be willing to finance the project although it would be efficient. This implies
ventures financed by an investor who can reinvest may, indeed, experience periods
in which they are not able to secure enough funding to go ahead.
Now suppose the original investor cannot refinance the project due to lack
of capital and a new investor, who did not observe the effort choice, has to be
convinced to invest capital. The new investor can pursue one of two possible
pure strategies. The first is to always refinance projects which had a low profit
realization. In this case the incentive for the entrepreneur not to exert effort dis-
appears because the project will never be shut down. Therefore, all projects with
low profit realizations must be bad quality projects with a negative expected net
present value. This strategy cannot be an equilibrium because the new investor
could always do better by not refinancing projects with low profit realizations.
The second possible strategy is never to refinance a project after a low profit
outcome. Again, the incentive for the entrepreneur not to exert effort disappears
because shirking leads to low profit for sure. Thus, all low profit projects must
be bad ones and it is optimal for the new investor not to refinance. However
in period one, the original investor anticipates that the entrepreneur will exert
effort and is willing to finance even marginal projects.
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The soft budget constraint problem dates back at least to Kornai (1979)5.
Schmidt (1996) and Cremér (1995) discuss settings different from ours in which
less information helps to harden the budget constraint. A effect similar to ours has
been noted independently by Bergemann and Hege (2002) albeit in an asymmetric
information environment and without relating it to the venture capital cycle.
Closely related to this paper is Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) who show
that investors may profit from being able to commit not to refinance projects.
They argue that there is a coordination problem and two types of equilibria.
One in which all investors pool their endowments and form a few large banks and
another one in which the investors remain small. They use this result to explain
the coexistence of different financial systems in different countries such as the
Anglo-Saxon and the German-Japanese ones.
We use a related model that allows us to explain the coexistence of large
banks and small venture capitalists within a financial system, e.g. the Anglo-
Saxon one. Moreover, we can characterize the kind of projects that are most
likely to suffer from the soft budget constraint problem and have to be financed
by small investors. We find that this characterization is broadly in line with
anecdotal evidence.
Inderst and Muennich (2001) look at the same question that we consider and
point out another advantage of limiting the amount of capital available to venture
capitalists. They show that ex-post competition for additional capital by success-
5See Maskin (1999) for an overview over the literature on hard and soft budget constraints.
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ful projects can improve ex-ante incentives. We suggest that restricting capital
for failed projects has a similar effect. Both effects are likely to be important in
reality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model.
In Section II two different intermediaries called venture capital funds (with limited
capital) and banks (with unlimited capital) are compared. Section III discusses
some assumptions and possible extensions of the model. Finally, Section IV
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
I The Model
In this section we consider a model of the investment and learning process which
leads either to a new business or to the abandonment of the project. We use
this model to study the contracting problems that arise if the wealth constrained
entrepreneur needs to obtain funding from an investor.
The project requires two types of inputs. First, it requires effort that can only
be supplied by the entrepreneur. For simplicity, the entrepreneur has a binary
choice whether to supply effort or not. Effort is assumed to be costless which
allows us to focus on the soft budget constraint problem.6
6See Gebhardt (2001) for an extension with private costs of effort. This adds a standard
moral hazard problem which is shown not to interact with the soft budget constraint question
studied here.
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Most entrepreneurs tend to work very hard. However, many start-ups are
founded by engineers or scientists who derive a private benefit from breakthroughs
in research even if these are not commercially viable. Hence, they dislike spend-
ing time on tasks like marketing and investor relations and prefer to develop the
product that is most interesting to them but not necessarily best to sell to cus-
tomers. Thus, exerting effort for the founders means to "drop their pet projects
to ensure the success of our principal product"7, as the entrepreneur quoted in
the introduction put it.
An inside investor can detect if the entrepreneur neglects the investor’s in-
terests but it will be difficult to prove the misbehavior to outsiders like other
investors or a court. This is modeled by making the effort choice observable to
the investor who has supplied capital in the same period but not observable to
potential new investors or courts. In fact, our assumption is that the investor
must observe the effort choice even if he preferred not to do so, reflecting the fact
that an investor who takes serious his role as an adviser cannot avoid noticing
clues as to whether the entrepreneur pursues the investors best interests.
The second input is a capital investment K which must be provided by an
outside investor because the entrepreneur does not have any wealth. It is either
supplied or not, which reflects the lumpy nature of investments in the early phase
of a firm (e.g. laboratories or clinical trials).
In every period in which there is investment the entrepreneur receives a non
7Clayton, Gambill, and Harned (1999) p.51.
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transferable private benefit b < K. This captures the fact that founders are
not only motivated by monetary incentives but also look for independence and
have a missionary zeal for their innovation. If the project is successful8 there is
a verifiable monetary payoff of R, which should be interpreted as the expected
net present value of the cash flows generated by the business idea given that
a milestone has been reached. Both payoffs, monetary and not monetary, are
discounted by both players by the same discountfactor δ.
Because success is meant to model events after which the firm continues to
exist so that the entrepreneur does not lose her private benefits we assume that the
entrepreneur gets a private benefit of B in this case. An analytically convenient
specification is to assume that the benefit is as high as it would be in the case
of continued investment, i.e. B = δb
1−δ . However, other specifications would not
change the qualitative results as long as B is a monotonic function of b.
The uncertainty involved in the implementation of a new business idea is
captured by the assumption that there are good and bad projects and both the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist only know the prior probability λ0 of the
project being good.
The two types of projects differ with respect to their probabilities of success.
Thus, each period in which both inputs are supplied results in a signal about
8Success can be any event that is observable by investors outside a specific venture capital
relationship and that makes future success more likely, e.g. a patent, a working prototype or
the acquisition of launch customers. Practitioners refer to these events as milestones.
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quality so that uncertainty is resolved over time in a learning by doing process.
More precisely, in each period (subsequently denoted by t) in which both inputs
are supplied the probability of success is γ > 0 for the good project and zero for
the bad project. If one of the inputs is missing the probability of success is zero
independent of the type. This assumption is stronger than necessary and imposed
for simplicity. For the results to go through it suffices that effort increases the
probability of success.
If one of the inputs has not been supplied in a certain period nothing can
be learned from a bad realization at the end of the period. In the following, we
will call this event "no signal". If there has been investment and effort there is
either success (also called a "good signal") and the game ends or failure (a "bad
signal").
To formally describe the resolution of uncertainty we introduce the following
notation. Let λt denote the belief by the players9 that the project is good at the
beginning of period t. The possible values that λt can take on are contained in a
sequence indexed by superscript k: {λk}∞0 , where λk is the belief that the project
is good after both inputs have been supplied k-times without success. λk evolves
according to Bayes Rule:
λk+1 =
λk(1− γ)
1− λkγ (1)
9For the moment we restrict ourselves to the case of symmetric information so that the
beliefs are identical for all players. Later we will have to consider differing beliefs.
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Hence for any k, λk can be written as a function of λ0:
λk =
λ0(1− γ)k
1− λ0 + λ0(1− γ)k (2)
If at the beginning of period t the belief was λt = λk and there is no signal in
period t because one of the inputs was missing then λt+1 = λt = λk. If there was,
however, a bad signal then λt+1 = λk+1.
It is efficient to invest and exert effort as long as the project has a positive
net present value, i.e as long as10
λt ≥ λ∗ = K
γR
We can then implicitly define k∗ as the efficient number of trials by
λk
∗ ≥ λ∗ > λk∗+1
The game consists of N = k∗+1 periods.11 This finite horizon set-up is chosen
not only for convenience. We are considering investments into new business
models and technologies. In almost all these cases competitors are working on
the same ideas or ideas that could serve as a substitute so that there is a limited
window of opportunity for the venture. This aspect is better captured in a finite
horizon model. However, the results do not depend on this assumption. In Section
III we informally discuss an infinite horizon version in which we get qualitatively
identical results.
10In this definition of the first best we are ignoring the private benefit B because no contract
could possibly extract that benefit from the wealth constrained entrepreneur.
11Any other finite horizon with N > k∗ periods, will lead to qualitatively the same results.
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Each period begins with the entrepreneur making a take-it-or-leave-it offer for
a financing contract, which is subsequently either accepted or rejected.12 If it is
rejected any existing contract remains valid. If no contract exists a null contract
(no investment in all future periods) is assumed to be the default option. Then,
investment takes place followed by the effort choice of the entrepreneur. At the
end of the period the profit is realized. The following figure depicts the exact
timing of one period of the game:
-1 2 3 4 5
contract
offer
accept
yes/no
investment
according
to contract
effort
is exerted
yes/no
profits are
realized
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Let us specify the contracting environment in order to derive the set of all
admissible financing contracts that may be offered by the entrepreneur. First of
all, investment is observable by both parties and contractible. A contract offered
in period t may, therefore, specify an obligation for the investor to provide capital
in period t.13 In addition revenues R are contractible so that a contract can lay
down a sharing rule where Et is the payment to the entrepreneur if there is success
in period t.14 It denotes the respective payment to the investor, i.e. It = R−Et.
12This amounts to assuming that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power. We discuss
the impact of a change in the distribution of bargaining power in Section III.
13Allowing for contracts specifying random investments does not change the results while
complicating the exposition.
14That does not necessarily mean that the occurrence of success is contractible. One should
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Because the effort choice cannot be observed by outsiders it is not contractible.
The fact that we only consider one period contracts may seem highly restric-
tive, however, once we have established our main results we can show with a
simple argument that allowing any kind of long term contract does not change
the qualitative results. We present that argument in Section III.
We compare two types of intermediaries called "bank" and "venture capital-
ist".15 As will become clear later most other forms of financing e.g. business
angels, internal capital markets or corporate venture capital can be subsumed
under one of these types. While there are many characteristics distinguishing
these intermediaries we will concentrate on the amount of capital available to
them.
The bank type is an intermediary that has enough capital to finance any
number of investment rounds without resorting to outside investors to supply
it with additional funds.16 The venture capitalist has only a limited amount of
capital so that he can finance only one round of investment. Hence, other venture
think of the sharing rule as shares of equity held by the investor and the entrepreneur respec-
tively.
15We do not consider direct financing via capital markets as start-ups are usually too small to
have access to it. Moreover, it is well established that intermediaries provide countless valuable
services such as advice, executive search and monitoring. See e.g. Gompers (1995) or Sahlman
(1990).
16Apart from banks this category could also include internal capital markets in mature firms
with free cash flow.
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capital funds have to be found to take over financing the portfolio company so
that the continuation decision is delegated to the new venture capitalists.17 A
convenient way to introduce this distinction into our model is to model the bank
as a single player that can observe the effort choice of the entrepreneur and the
venture capital fund as a single player that cannot observe the effort choice.
II Venture Capital Funds and Banks
We can now use the model to compare the different types of investors and de-
termine why venture capitalists do better than banks when it comes to financing
innovations.
We first look at a bank, i.e. an investor who has observed past effort choices.
We can calculate the equilibrium by backward induction. Suppose the game has
arrived in the ultimate period (N) and at least one more trial would be efficient
(k < k∗). Then the unique continuation equilibrium is for the entrepreneur to
propose a share IN = KγλN to the investor, who accepts it and exerts effort. High
effort is optimal for the entrepreneur because otherwise she would forgo a positive
probability to get her share in the monetary return (and the private benefit B).
The share (IN) makes the bank just break-even given the entrepreneur’s effort
choice and is, therefore, the lowest share accepted by the investor. A similar
17We will relax the assumption that a venture capital fund has just enough capital to fund a
firm only once in Section III.
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argument can be made for any period in which the number of additional trials
that would be efficient is larger than the number of remaining periods. In these
cases the continuation equilibria implement the efficient investment and effort
choices and the entrepreneur gets the whole surplus.
Suppose, however, the game has arrived in the penultimate period (N − 1)
and only one further trial is efficient (λN−1 = λk
∗). Now it is no longer sure
that the efficient investment and effort decisions take place. To see why, assume
the entrepreneur has proposed IN−1 ≥ KγλN−1 and the investor has accepted. If
the entrepreneur now does exert effort the game ends for sure either because the
project is successful or because λN < λ∗ and it is no longer efficient to try out
the new business. If she does not exert effort the game moves into the last period
and the efficient choice is implemented.
In the latter case the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is
ΠNE = b+ δ
[
b+ γλk
∗
(R +B)−K]
while in the former it is
ΠE = b+ γλk
∗
(R +B)−K.
Subtracting the equations from each other we get the following condition that
must hold so that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort given the above
contract:
ΠE ≥ ΠNE ⇔ (1− γλk∗)δb ≤ (1− δ) [γλk∗R−K] (3)
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The advantage of shirking is that the entrepreneur can enjoy an additional period
of the private benefit in case the project ultimately fails, the cost is that the
potential monetary payoff is delayed by one period. If the private benefit is large
or the expected surplus is low, delaying the project may be profitable for the
entrepreneur. In this case the investor will not be willing to finance the project
in the first place and the entrepreneur faces a financing crisis.
It can be shown by backward induction that if the entrepreneur does not have
an incentive in the last period to shirk she does not have one in the earlier periods,
either. Intuitively a higher belief λ decreases the probability of failure and delays
its occurrence and, therefore, decreases the value of an additional b in this case.
In addition it means that there are more efficient trials left which increases the
the net present value that is delayed and, therefore, the cost of shirking. More
formally in period t with belief λt = λk, k < k∗ the condition for not exerting
effort is given by18
b ≤
(1− δ){1−[δ(1−γ)]k
∗−k
1−δ(1−γ) λ
k(γR−K)− 1−δk∗−k
1−δ (1− λk)K}
[1− λk + λk(1− γ)k∗−k]δk∗−k (4)
It remains to characterize equilibrium play if (3) is violated. Because there
are k∗+1 periods the project cannot be delayed more than once. However, if (3)
is violated it must be delayed at least once. Thus we know that in equilibrium
there will be investment and effort in N − 1 periods and neither investment nor
18See the proof of proposition 1 in the appendix for the backward induction argument, the
derivation of condition 4 and a formal argument why (4) always holds if (3) holds.
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effort in one period.
The exact timing of the delay can be determined by working backwards.
Suppose (3) is violated and in N − 2 there are still two efficient trials to go,
i.e. there has not been delay so far. Independent of the equilibrium play in
period N − 2 the ultimate trial will take place in the last period. Either the
penultimate trial is delayed to period N − 1, in this case the ultimate trial can
only take place in period N , or the penultimate trial is not delayed, then we are
back in the situation we analyzed above and because (3) is violated the last trial
will be delayed to period N .
Then the decision problem for the entrepreneur, whether to exert effort or
not given that investment has taken place, looks exactly like it did in the case of
the ultimate trial only that the belief now is λk∗−1. The entrepreneur will exert
effort given a contract that gives her the whole surplus if
(1− γλk∗−1)δb ≤ (1− δ) [γλk∗−1R−K] . (5)
In this case the investor will accept the financing contract if (5) is violated he will
not do so in the first place and the projects stops for one period and is completed
in the last two periods.
Equilibrium play if (3) is violated can then be found by the following algo-
rithm. If (5) holds the project will be delayed exactly in period N − 1. If it does
not hold we have to work backwards to find the first period in which λt is large
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enough so that the project will not be delayed, i.e.
(1− γλt)δb ≤ (1− δ) [γλtR−K] . (6)
If we can find one the delay happens in period t + 1, if we cannot it happens in
period one. Note that the less often the project has been undertaken the larger
is λt and the larger is the cost of delay and the smaller is the gain. Hence, for
the first trials the incentive not to exert effort may disappear.19
Note that, so far, we have not proved that 6 ensures that the entrepreneur
will always have an incentive to work hard in periods before t. We leave this to
the proof of proposition 1 in the appendix. Proposition 1 summarizes the main
results:
Proposition 1 With bank financing projects are inefficiently delayed in equilib-
rium if and only if
b >
1− δ
(1− γλk∗)δ (γλ
k∗R−K). (7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us contrast this result with financing by a venture capitalist who does not
have enough funds to finance a second round of investment and who, therefore,
has to find another venture capital fund to provide capital in subsequent periods.
This new investor has not observed the effort choices of the entrepreneur so far
and will base his decision only on the publicly available information, i.e. how
19Allowing more periods can lead to multiple and longer spells of delay, however, the condition
for no delay remains the same.
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often there has been investment and whether the project has been successful so
far or not.
Let us again work backwards from the last period. There the entrepreneur
again never has an incentive to shirk because delay is impossible. Hence, there is
always a financing contract that a new venture capitalist accepts as long as the
new venture capitalist holds a belief larger than λ∗. Note that this belief cannot
depend on the actual effort choices of the entrepreneur in earlier periods but only
on expected equilibrium play.
The entrepreneur anticipates this, when deciding whether to supply effort or
not in the penultimate period. She understands that failed projects are either
always or never refinanced in the last period. If failed projects are never refinanced
in the last period any kind of failure, be it due to lack of effort or not, is punished
with termination. Thus, she will always exert effort because this increases the
probability of success. If her project is always refinanced in the last period failure
is never punished by termination and the incentive not to exert effort disappears,
too.
Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the entrepreneur to exert effort in the
penultimate period if her offer has been accepted by a venture capitalist. Antici-
pating this a new venture capitalist will be willing to supply capital in exchange
for a share in R that makes him just break even in expectation. The same argu-
ment holds for all previous periods so that the equilibrium beliefs of the entering
venture capitalists must be that the entrepreneur has always exerted effort if
19
capital has been invested. From that follows that there will be venture capital-
ists willing to supply capital for exactly k∗ trials so that the first best is always
implemented. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 2 With venture capital finance the first best is always implemented.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, projects with a high probability of failure but the same expected
net present value should suffer more from the soft budget constraint problem
because the incentive not to exert effort even though it is costless is derived from
the benefit of another round of investment in the case of failure. This benefit
goes up if the probability of failure goes up.
To formalize this intuition we introduce a sequence of projects that have the
same initial probability λ0 to be of good quality and the same net present value
conditional on being good V = γR. They differ, however, with respect to their γ
and R. More precisely, we start with a project with some γ and R, and therefore
a certain V . Along the sequence we decrease γ and adjust R according to R = V
γ
,
i.e we increase R so that V stays constant.
Considering condition 5 we can calculate for each project in the sequence a
threshold value λˆ so that there is delay if the belief drops below that value. λˆ is
implicitly defined by
(1− γλˆ)δb = (1− δ)
[
λˆV −K
]
.
20
The larger λˆ the more a project suffers from the soft budget constraint problem.
Increasing risk by decreasing γ while holding V constant increases λˆ which con-
firms our intuition that riskier projects suffer more from the soft budget constraint
problem.
Proposition 3 sums up this comparative statics result.
Proposition 3 Consider a sequence of projects indexed by subscript p with the
same λ0p = λ¯0 and Vp = γpRp = V¯ , but decreasing (increasing) values of γp (Rp).
Then the threshold value for the belief λˆp(γp) below which there is delay is falling
in γp.
III Extensions and Discussion
The qualitative results do not depend on the finite horizon set-up. In an infinite
horizon model one can show that in each case (banking and venture capital) there
is a unique Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (MPBE) properties similar to
the properties of the respective equilibria in the finite horizon case. Here we just
give an informal argument.
Consider a game in which each period is identical to the game under bank
financing but where there is an infinite number of periods. Note that in this game
all payoff relevant information is summarized by the belief λt, which we call the
state of the game. In a MPBE strategies can only be conditioned on the payoff
relevant components of the history. Hence, whenever the game is in a certain
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state the ensuing equilibrium play has to be the same. As in the finite horizon
game we are interested in the condition that has to hold so that the first best is
achieved in the bank case.
Suppose equilibrium play is efficient, i.e. there is investment and effort when-
ever the game is in a state λt ≥ λk∗ and there is neither in every state λt < λk∗+1.
For this to be an equilibrium it is a necessary condition that it is optimal for the
entrepreneur to exert effort when the state λt = λk
∗ and the contract in place
prescribes investment in exchange for It = Kγλk∗ .
In this situation, if the entrepreneur exerts effort, there is either success or
the game moves on to state λk∗+1 with no future investment. This results in an
expected payoff of b+ γλk∗(R+B)−K to the entrepreneur. By deviating to no
effort the entrepreneur makes success in t impossible and keeps the game in state
λk
∗ so that the first best is implemented in period t+ 1. The expected payoff is
then b + δ[b + γλk∗(R + B) − K]. Comparing the two expected payoffs results
in exactly the same condition 3 as in the finite horizon game. If it is fulfilled
exerting effort is optimal and the first best is indeed an equilibrium. By the same
arguments as in the finite horizon game we can show that if there is no delay at
λ∗, there is none for higher λ’s so that inequality 3 is not only a necessary but
also a sufficient condition for the first-best to be reached.
If this condition is violated, however, the game drops into an inefficient mixed
strategy continuation equilibrium with random delay. The entrepreneur offers I =
R to the bank and exerts effort with a low enough probability so that the investor
22
is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. If the entrepreneur
has not exerted effort the bank refinances with a low enough probability to make
the entrepreneur just indifferent between effort and no effort.
In the case of bank financing it can be shown by the same arguments as in the
finite horizon game that the first-best is the unique MPBE for all parameters.
The assumption that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power in all
periods deserves further discussion. First, note that a simultaneous reduction of
the entrepreneur’s bargaining power in all periods reduces the surplus available
to the entrepreneur. This implies a reduction of the cost of delay and exacerbates
the soft budget constraint problem.
However, more of a problem could be the case of changing bargaining power
during the course of the game. Off the equilibrium path only the investor involved
in the project has observed the effort choice and has, therefore, a higher belief
λ than other investors. Being the only available investor he should be able to
negotiate a higher share in the surplus than on the equilibrium path where he
had to compete with many other investors.
Consider parameters so that with constant bargaining power there would be
delay in period N − 1, if there was not any before. Can delay be avoided with
changing bargaining power? By exerting effort in period N − 1 the entrepreneur
still gets b + γλk∗(R + B) − K. But if she delays all other banks will believe
the project is bad and will not refinance only the bank that has observed the
effort choice is left. Let us make the most extreme assumption that this bank
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can extract all the monetary payoff. Then by delaying the entrepreneur gets only
b+ δ(b+ γλk
∗
B−K). Rearranging yields the following condition for effort to be
supplied
(1− γλk∗)δb ≤ [γλk∗R−K]
This condition is less strict than (3) but still not the first best. The soft budget
constraint problem does not disappear for projects with small enough surplus in
the last period and large enough private benefits. Again this argument holds
even stronger for projects that with constant bargaining power would experience
delay in an earlier period than N − 1.
So far, we have also neglected long-term contracts. First, note that whenever
a contract leading to an outcome that is less efficient than the one with one period
contracts is in place at the beginning of a period it will be renegotiated. This
implies especially that after the project has been delayed once, the first best is
implemented. In this case there is always the benefit b to the entrepreneur, which
cannot be extracted by the investor due to the wealth constraint.
The maximum a long-term contract can do is to transfer as much of the
monetary surplus to the investor in case the project is delayed. This could be
achieved by a first period contract that gives the investor an option to reinvest
in exchange for R in period N . Effectively, this contract shifts all the bargaining
power in period N to the investor. However, as we have seen this mitigates the
incentive to delay but is not enough to eliminate the inefficiency.
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Another assumption was that the venture capitalist can never refinance a
portfolio company. Again, this assumption is not necessary for the result. To see
this we introduce a probability ρ that the venture capitalist has some capital left
into equation 7. In this case it reads as follows:
b >
(1− ρδ)(γλk∗R−K)
(1− 1−ρδ
1−δ γλ
k∗)ρδ
.
If ρ = 1 we are back in the bank case. If ρ is reduced, however, the threshold value
of b increases and it goes to infinity as the probability to have some capital left
goes to zero. Hence, as long as ρ is less than one there is a gain from hardening
the budget constraint through the venture capital cycle, i.e. there are projects
which are delayed with bank financing but not with venture capital financing.
IV Conclusion
We have shown that projects which have a high probability of failure and offer
a high private benefit to the entrepreneur will profit most from the hard bud-
get constraint venture capital financing provides. And, indeed, the innovative
projects normally financed by venture capitalists are characterized by these two
features. How large the efficiency advantage of venture capital financing can be
is demonstrated by Clayton, Gambill, and Harned (1999) in their case study of
the development of hand-held organizers:
In the early nineties Palm Computing and Apple roughly simultaneously
developed palm-sized computers. Both were initially not successful with cus-
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tomers. While venture capital financed Palm Computing was forced to dramati-
cally change the design of its organizer in a way that made it simpler and cheaper
Apple only reacted with small modifications. In the end Palm Computing took
the market having spent only $ 8 million on the development while Apple ended
its efforts unsuccessfully after devoting more than $ 500 million to it.20
20See Clayton, Gambill, and Harned (1999) p.48.
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V Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the subgame in which the game is in the last period (N) and the
belief is λk∗ . Suppose at time four in this period investment has been provided
and some contract with a share EN ≥ 0 for the entrepreneur is in place. Then it
is optimal for the entrepreneur to exert effort because it is costless and she gets
a nonnegative monetary payoff in case of success.
At time two the investor will accept any contract which makes him break even
given that he expects effort to be supplied and given his belief λk∗ . He will accept
any contract as long as
IN ≥ Iˆ = K
γλk∗
.
In this case the entrepreneur will offer the lowest possible share IN = Iˆ at time
one.
If the bank enters the last period with a belief λ < λ∗ there is no contract
that allows the entrepreneur to break even and no investment will take place.
Now consider the subgame in which the game is in period N − 1 and both
players hold the belief λk∗ , i.e. so far there has not been delay. Suppose at time
one a contract with Iˆ has been proposed and accepted and the entrepreneur has
to decide whether to exert effort or not. If she chooses high effort the project will
not be financed in period N and the period N payoff will be zero. Therefore, the
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expected payoff from supplying effort is
ΠE = b+ γλ∗(R +B)−K.
If she does not exert effort by the above argument the project will receive financing
in period N and the expected period N payoff will be b+ γλ∗(R+B)−K. Thus
the expected payoff of no effort in period N − 1 is
ΠNE = b+ δb+ δ(γλ∗(R +B)−K).
Condition 7 follows from comparing these two expected payoffs and solving for b.
If condition 7 holds it is better for the entrepreneur not to exert effort. Because
this holds even stronger for any contract offering an I > Iˆ there is no period N−1
contract acceptable to the investor which can elicit effort and no investment will
take place.
If condition 7 does not hold, a contract with Iˆ does induce effort. Therefore,
it will be accepted by the investor. Because it is the contract with the lowest
share for the investor that is still accepted by the investor the entrepreneur will
propose it in equilibrium. We can conclude that there will be no delay in period
N − 1 if there has not been delay before and if condition 7 does not hold.
To prove that there will be no delay in earlier periods if there is no delay in
period N − 1 the following expressions will be useful. Suppose the game is at
the beginning of period t and the belief λt = λk. Further suppose that there will
be no delay in the continuation equilibrium starting with period t, that there
are enough periods to undertake k∗ trials and that the entrepreneur captures the
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whole surplus. Then the expected monetary payoff for the entrepreneur is given
by
Mk = γλk(R− K
γλk
)+δ(1−γ)γλk(R− K
γλk+1
)+· · ·+δk∗−k(1−γ)k∗−kγλk(R− K
γλk∗
)
Using the updating relationship in equation 2
Mk = γλkR−K + δ(1− γ)γλkR− δ[1− λk + λk(1− γ)]K + · · ·+
+δk
∗−k(1− γ)k∗−kγλkR− [1− λk + λk(1− γ)k∗−k]K
=
1− [δ(1− γ)]k∗−k+1
1− δ(1− γ) λ
k(γR−K)− 1− δ
k∗−k+1
1− δ (1− λ
k)K
Note that Mk > Mk′ if k′ > k.
Similarly, we can write the expected value of the private benefits in period t
with the belief λk under the identical assumptions as above as
Bk = b+ γλk
δb
1− δ + [1− λ
k + λk(1− γ)]δb+ λk(1− γ)γ δ
2b
1− δ + · · ·+
+[1− λk + λk(1− γ)k∗−k]δk∗−kb+ γλk(1− γ)k∗−k δ
k∗−k+1b
1− δ
= γλk
b
1− δ + γλ
k(1− γ) b
1− δ + · · ·+ γλ
k(1− γ)k∗−k b
1− δ +
+[1− λk + λk(1− γ)k∗−k+1](b+ δb+ · · ·+ δk∗−kb)
= γλk
1− (1− γ)k∗−k+1
1− (1− γ)
b
1− δ + [1− λ
k + λk(1− γ)k∗−k+1]1− δ
k∗−k+1
1− δ b
= [1− δk∗−k+1 + (λk − λk(1− γ)k∗−k+1)δk∗−k+1] b
1− δ
Again note that Bk > Bk′ if k′ > k.
Suppose the parameters violate condition 7 and consider the subgame in which
the game is in period N − 2 and both players hold the belief λk∗−1, i.e. so far
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there has not been delay. Suppose at time one a contract with IN−2 = Kγλk∗−1
has been proposed and accepted and the entrepreneur has to decide whether to
exert effort or not. From a backwards induction argument follows that if she
exerts effort her expected payoff will be Mk∗−1 +Bk∗−1, if she does not it will be
b+ δ(Mk
∗−1 +Bk
∗−1). Hence, she will exert effort if
b− (1− δ)Bk∗−1 ≤ (1− δ)Mk∗−1.
Solving for b on the left hand side we get
[1−γλk∗−1(2−γ)]δ2b ≤ (1−δ){1− [δ(1− γ)]
2
1− δ(1− γ) λ
k∗−1(γR−K)−1− δ
2
1− δ (1−λ
k∗−1)K}
(8)
Noting that condition 7 can be written as
b > (1− δ)(Mk∗ +Bk∗).
we can see that (8) always holds when (7) is violated so that there will be no
delay in period N − 2 if there is none in period N − 1.
For earlier periods N−l with l > 2 we can prove the same result by induction.
Suppose the game is in period N − l with l > 2 and the players hold the belief
λN−l = λk
∗−l+1. If from period N − l + 1 on the project will be pursued without
delay until λN = λk
∗ then the entrepreneur will exert effort given a contract that
gives him all the surplus if
b ≤ (1− δ)(Mk∗−l+1 +Bk∗−l+1).
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This condition is always fulfilled if (7) is violated and can be rewritten as
b ≤
(1− δ){1−[δ(1−γ)]l
1−δ(1−γ) λ
k∗−l+1(γR−K)− 1−δl
1−δ (1− λk
∗−l+1)K}
[1− λk∗−l+1 + λk∗−l+1(1− γ)l]δl (9)
Anticipating the effort choice of the entrepreneur the investor will accept any
financing contract offer that gives him
IN−l+1 ≥ K
γλk−l+1
and the entrepreneur will propose
IN−l+1 =
K
γλk−l+1
at time one.
This proves the only if part of the proposition.
To prove the if part of the proposition the following expression will be useful.
Let us denote by Πk (0 ≤ k ≤ k∗) the expected present value of payoffs (monetary
and private) to the entrepreneur if the project, which is thought to be of good
quality with probability λk, is pursued without delay as long as λt ≥ λk∗ .
Suppose, we are in period N − l, l ≥ 0 and a financing contract IN−l = KγλN−l
has been accepted and the entrepreneur has to decide whether to exert effort or
not. If in the continuation equilibrium after exerting effort without success there
will neither be financing nor effort in the next period (N− l+1), the continuation
payoff from effort for the entrepreneur from period N − l + 2 on will be Πk+1.
The expected payoff from exerting effort in period N − 1 to the entrepreneur is
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then
b+ γλk(R +B)−K + δ0 + δ2(1− γλk)Πk+1.
If in the continuation equilibrium after shirking the project will be efficiently
implemented and the whole surplus will go to the entrepreneur, the continuation
payoff for the entrepreneur from period N − l + 2 on will again be Πk+1. The
expected payoff of shirking to the entrepreneur is then in period N − l
b+ δ(b+ γλk(R +B)−K) + δ2(1− γλk)Πk+1.
Hence, the entrepreneur will not exert effort in period N − l if
b >
1− δ
(1− γλN−l)δ (γλN−lR−K). (10)
Given what we know about equilibrium play in period N − 1 if (7) holds we
can now work backwards. If (10) holds for λN−2 = λk
∗−1 the project will delayed
in period N−2 and then implemented efficiently from period N−1 on. A similar
argument can be made for any period N − l, l > 2 and beliefs λN−l = λk∗−l+1.
We have shown that if the project has not been delayed it will be delayed
in the first period in which (10) holds. After this delay it will be implemented
efficiently. Therefore, if (10) holds for λ0 then the project will be delayed in the
first period and then be implemented efficiently.
However, to complete the characterization of equilibrium play we have to show
that the project is not delayed from period one until period N − l if (10) fails to
hold the first time for λN−l < λ0. To do this let us define λkˆ as the lowest belief
for which (10) does not hold.
32
Now suppose, we are in some period N− l, l ≥ 0 with a belief of λk, k < kˆ and
a financing contract IN−l = KγλN−l has been accepted and the entrepreneur has to
decide whether to exert effort or not. If she does not exert effort her expected
payoff is
ΠNE = b+ δ[Mk +Bk]
= b+ δ[Mk − δkˆ+1−kM kˆ+1 + δkˆ+1−kM kˆ+1 +Bk − δkˆ+1−kBkˆ+1 + δkˆ+1−kBkˆ+1].
If she does exert effort her expected payoff is
ΠE = Mk − δkˆ+1−kM kˆ+1 + δkˆ+2−kM kˆ+1 +Bk − δkˆ+1−kBkˆ+1 + δkˆ+2−kBkˆ+1.
And she does exert effort if
b ≤ (1− δ)[Mk − δkˆ−k+1M kˆ+1 +Bk − δkˆ−k+1Bkˆ+1] (11)
We can rewrite condition 10 for λN−l = λkˆ so that
b > (1− δ)[M kˆ − δM kˆ+1 +Bkˆ − δBkˆ+1] (12)
holds.
We have defined kˆ so that (12) is violated from which follows that (11) holds
for any k < kˆ. This proves that the entrepreneur has no incentive to shirk in any
period N − l.
In a nutshell if condition 7 holds the project will be delayed in exactly one
period that can be determined by the algorithm above. This proves the if part
of the proposition.‖
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Proof of Proposition 2
Let λVt be the belief of a newly entering venture capitalist in period t. In
period N the entrepreneur will always exert effort because in case of success she
gets B and EN the latter being weakly positive due to the wealth constraint of
the entrepreneur. Anticipating this the venture capitalist will accept any con-
tract with IN ≥ IˆN = KγλVN . As long as λ
V
N ≥ λ∗ this implies EN ≥ 0 and the
entrepreneur will propose a contract with IˆN . Otherwise there is no investment.
Let λEt be the belief of the entrepreneur in period t. In period N − 1 the
entrepreneur will always exert effort as long as EN−1 ≥ 0 because the refinancing
decision and, therefore the expected payoff, in period N does not depend on the
effort choice in period N − 1. If she anticipates that there will not be investment
in period N by exerting effort she gets an expected payoff of b+γλEN−1(EN−1+B)
which is larger than b, the payoff from shirking.
If she anticipates investment in period N it is still better to exert effort.
Exerting effort gives a payoff of
b+ [γλEN−1(EN−1 +B)] + (1− γλEN−1)δ[b+ γλEN(EN +B)]
while no effort leads to
b+ δ[b+ γλEN(EN +B)]
which is smaller.
A similar argument holds for all periods. Hence, in all periods it is a dom-
inant strategy for the entrepreneur to exert effort if there has been investment.
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Therefore, the venture capitalist will invest in every period t in which λVt ≥ λ∗,
the entrepreneur exerts effort and gets the whole surplus. The only sequence of
beliefs for the venture capitalist that is consistent with these strategies is {λk}k∗0 .
With these beliefs there will be investment and effort in the first k∗ = N − 1
periods and no investment thereafter. This is the first best.‖
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